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nature of the system itself, and by the 
type of behavior it motivates on the part 
of many of the individuals in it. As such, 
the gap is unlikely to be bridged in the 
near future. 
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Bridging the Gap Between Economic 
Theory and Fisheries Management: 
Can the MFCMA Produce Economically 
Rational Management? Discussion 
JAMES E. KIRKLEY 
Discussing the relationship between 
economic theory and fisheries manage­
ment is a difficult task to ask of anyone. 
It is nearly impossible to do when the 
discussion is restricted to practical as­
pects. Given the complexity of such a 
discussion, Lee G. Anderson has pro­
vided an excellent discussion on the 
problems of managing fisheries with the 
MFCMA, particularly those relating to 
economics. 
More important, I believe, is that An­
derson has clearly identified and stated 
the problems which have limited the 
management of fisheries in accordance 
with economic goals and objectives. This 
has obviously been a source of consider-
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able frustration among economists in­
volved in fisheries management. 
Anderson poses one fundamental 
question about economics and manage­
ment. The question is "Is it likely that 
sound and economically rational man­
agement will be produced?" in accord­
ance with economic criteria. The criteria 
are concerned with proper use of fish and 
other resources over time with appropri­
ate attention given to all related costs in­
cluding harvest, programmatic, manage­
ment, implementation, and enforcement 
costs. The answer offered by Anderson, 
and which I concur, is "Not very." 
Two reasons why sound management 
will not be produced are given by Ander­
son. First, the institutional setting and in­
dustry structure hinders management. 
Second, the politically astute and power­
ful minorities force attention on self­
serving interests or away from economic 
goals and objectives. These are the same 
problems identified in the literature on 
regulating industry (e.g., Buchanan and 
Tollison, 1984; Crain, 1979; Eckert, 
1973; Sen, 1970; Hilton, 1972; Mc­
Cormick and Tollison, 1981). Other rea­
sons given in the literature for the failure 
of rational management include issue 
linkages or making trade-offs explicit 
among issues, conflicts of interest, and 
payment of managers and regulators. All 
of these would appear to be valid causes 
for the failure to achieve sound economic 
management of fisheries. 
Anderson provides a comprehensive 
discussion of the institutional setting and 
structure by which fisheries are managed 
and regulated under the MFCMA. His 
paper, in fact, might be more appropri­
ately titled "Collective choice, conflict­
ing criteria, and agency theory in manag­
ing fisheries." He notes the existence of 
multiple objectives, which are often quite 
diverse; the fact that there are many 
agents and individuals which affect or are 
affected by fisheries management; and 
that, in practice, management is often 
something upon which all concerned can 
agree. 
One aspect of the institutional setting 
which is properly accorded rigorous 
treatment in the paper is the relationship 
between the Fishery Management Coun­
cils and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service (NMFS). It is proposed that the 
relationship is one of animosity in which 
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the Council members and staff believe 
that NMFS is attempting to make the 
work of Councils more difficult and to 
take control of fisheries management. 
This argument has been heard many 
times and there is possibly some element 
of truth to it. On the other hand, NMFS' s 
staff have often complained that the 
Councils are attempting to exclude them 
from the management process or are not 
adhering to the guidelines which must be 
followed. There also is likely to be some 
truth to this. However, as correctly indi­
cated by Anderson, these attitudes are not 
conducive to good management. 
There is, though, another problem be­
tween the NMFS and the Councils which 
needs to be resolved. That is the problem 
of data sharing. Currently, NMFS col­
lects and distributes most of the data nec­
essary for formulating management plans 
and policies. However, the distribution 
of the data is often subject to restrictions. 
These restrictions may result in inade­
quate data for formulating and analyzing 
management plans and regulations. 
Thus, it is uncertain whether or not the 
council staff are provided the best data 
available and that management is based 
on the best available scientific informa­
tion. The only immediate solution to this 
problem is for the councils to request par­
ticular analyses from NMFS. 
Subsequently proposed in the paper is 
a political "bioregunomic" approach, the 
purpose of which is to provide an ex­
panded analysis of the entire manage­
ment process. This includes understand­
ing legislative behavior regarding policy 
and budgets, enforcement activities, firm 
behavior, and the stock dynamics. The 
approach captures the entire institutional 
structure and allows for the consideration 
of other activities such as lobbying fish­
ery agencies or the formation of "special 
interest" groups. 
The major importance of the proposed 
approach is that it indicates that rational 
economic management requires an 
understanding of activities by individuals 
and agencies other than NMFS, the 
Councils, and the fishing industry, and 
that fisheries utilization involves other 
types of management costs. In effect, the 
political bioregunomic approach focuses 
attention on a regulated equilibrium and 
an optimum utilization which considers 
all economic aspects of firm production, 
lobbying, avoiding regulation, and insti­
tuting and monitoring management pol­
icy. 
Most economists and managers would 
concur with the need to consider all the 
possible interactions suggested by An­
derson. However, we must consider the 
issues of whether or not it is possible to 
consider all the interactions, and what are 
the ramifications of not doing so. Previ­
ous experience would suggest it is neither 
possible nor feasible to adequately con­
sider all the interactions of so complex a 
system. We do not, as yet, appear to be 
able to deal with even the basic economic 
and biological issues. Nevertheless, 
Anderson's argument for considering a 
broader management framework is cor­
rect. 
A second question posited by Ander­
son is "How can the institutional and in­
dustry structures be altered such that the 
regulated equilibrium coincides with the 
expanded notion of optimal utilization?" 
Alternatively, "What types of regulation 
are optimal when the costs related to ac­
tivities other than fishing are consid­
ered?" 
A concise answer to this very difficult 
question is not provided in the paper. 
There is not, in fact, likely to be an easy 
answer. As I interpret Anderson, the 
process of formulating, implementing, 
monitoring, and enforcing management 
and regulations is too complex to offer an 
answer to the problem. 
Anderson does, however, imply some 
possible solutions: 
I) Other interests should be repre­
sented on the councils (e.g., consumer 
advocates and planners). 
2) Encourage broader response to pro­
posed management plans and regula­
tions. 
3) Promote greater cooperation be­
tween the states and Councils. 
4) Induce the U.S. Coast Guard to act 
in a coordinated way with NMFS. 
5) Specify objectives that have opera­
tional significance. 
6) Identify a set of alternative plans 
which specify optimum yield and how 
the harvest will be limited to that level. 
7) Impose a single-source account­
ability for success of a plan and grant it 
sufficient latitude and resources to do the 
job. 
There are, though, some possible 
problems with the implied solutions. 
First, prior attempts to broaden interests 
and responses have not been successful; 
there was often a lack of knowledge or 
understanding about fisheries and man­
agement. Second, some states have legal 
barriers which prevent cooperation. 
Third, the Coast Guard has experienced 
budget reductions, and thus, curtailed its 
fishery-related activities. They are not 
likely to increase their level of coopera­
tion without increases in their operating 
budget. Fourth, if operational objectives 
are well specified such that trade-offs are 
permitted, other interests will likely 
dominate the economic criteria and ob­
jectives. Last, a single-source account­
ability does not necessarily guarantee 
good management. Currently, the Secre­
tary of Commerce has final approval and 
is responsible for the fishery manage­
ment plan. Yet, there is not one FMP 
with well specified economic goals and 
objectives. 
Overall, I find little to criticize or find 
fault with in the paper by Anderson. Pol­
itics and "back-room bargaining" are an 
integral part of the management process; 
they do result in exploitation patterns 
which are not economically optimum. 
The fact that there is a trade-off between 
efficiency and equity in formulating 
management policies is well recognized; 
the equity aspects should be considered 
as well as the efficiency aspects (Layard 
and Walters, 1978). In general, I am in 
complete agreement with Anderson that 
given the economic criteria and institu­
tional structure, it is not very likely that 
sound economically rational manage­
ment will be produced under MFCMA. 
In diffidence to Anderson, however, I 
do not believe that the fault lies entirely 
with the MFCMA. My argument is simi­
lar to the statement against gun control 
that "guns don't kill people, people kill 
people." In managing fisheries, it is man 
that specifies goals, objectives, and regu­
lations. The paper upon which the Act is 
printed provides only a set of guidelines. 
The fact that Councils and NMFS have 
elected not to promote efficiency or min­
imize all costs is their decision. The Na-
Marine Fisheries Review 26 
tional Standards clearly indicate, where 
practical, that these conditions shall be 
considered. 
Instead, and with some fear, I offer 
that the reasons for the failure to achieve 
rational economical management are our 
predecessors and we economists of 
today. Alternatively, I propose that some 
of the failure is due to 1) our wide accep­
tance of economic theory and applied 
methods, 2) our limited and often inade­
quate economic analysis, and 3) the lack 
of importance placed on economics by 
NMFS and the councils. 
I do not propose to know all there is to 
know about economic theory and applied 
methods. However, I do know that al­
most every paper or text on detennining 
the optimum rate of exploitation com­
mences with a control theoretic model 
(e.g., Clark, 1976, 1985; Waugh, 1984). 
Most often, the objective is to maximize 
total net discounted revenues of the in­
dustry subject to a growth-removal equi­
librium condition: 
00 
Max I e(-rt)o[Poh(t) 
o 
- C(X)oh(t)]dt, (1) 
subject to [F(X) - h(t)] 
where P is output price, h is output, C is 
cost per unit of h, X is stock size, F(X) 
is a growth function, r is the social dis­
count rate, and t is time. 
Although there have been substantial 
variations of equation (1) which include 
multiple objectives, uncertainty, price re­
sponse to quantity changes, and different 
growth functions, I think we must ask the 
question "How can management authori­
ties seriously consider economic objec­
tives if equation (1) cannot be solved if 
expanded to include Anderson's political 
bioregunomics framework. A simple ex­
pansion of equation (1) is all we have to 
offer?" It is also quite likely that equa­
tion (1) in which demand includes substi­
tute species, cost is not separable be­
tween stocks and production, and the 
production technology varies over finns 
would likely present a difficult problem 
to solve. 
Equation (I) also suggests another 
possible failure on our part and relates to 
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Anderson's criteria for an intertemporal 
harvest plan in which the correct amount 
is harvested each year. First, is there any 
reason to believe that any of the eco­
nomic functions will be constant over all 
time periods; dynamic processes charac­
terize fisheries. Second, equation (1) 
leads to either a steady state solution or a 
"bang-bang" control; we must ask 
whether these solutions are practical, rea­
sonable, and feasible. Intuitively, I doubt 
it. Third, if the problem was specified as 
a finite time horizon problem, how would 
we establish the appropriate time inter­
val? A quick review of five texts (Chow, 
1975; Clark, 1976, 1985; Kamien and 
Schwartz, 1981; Mangel, 1985) fails to 
provide any guidance about the relation­
ship between specification, solution, and 
the selection of a time interval in a dy­
namic problem. 
In practice, I know of no fishery in 
which the mangement rules were estab­
lished based on a control model. The 
problem, in fact, is not caused by the 
control theoretic approach. The problem 
is, however, related to the control model. 
The model serves as a reference for the 
economic theory and principles used to 
analyze the economics of fisheries, and it 
provides the basis for establishing eco­
nomic goals and objectives of manage­
ment. The consistent publication of con­
trol models in the literature only serves to 
reinforce its use by economists. 
A further examination of equation (1) 
and relating it to economic theory and 
research needs illustrates the second pos­
sible reason why I believe economists are 
part of the problem. Most often, the 
specifications of the economic and 
growth functions in equation (1) or in 
other economic models used in fisheries 
are overly simplified. In many instances, 
the economic specifications bear no re­
semblance to economic theory. 
For example, what type of inverse de­
mand function has nominal price as a lin­
ear function of only the quantity demand. 
As economists, we know that the ex­
vessel demand is a derived demand and 
should satisfy certain properties. Yet, the 
managment plans and economic analyses 
of fisheries abound with these ad-hoc 
price response specifications. Alterna­
tively, how many fisheries are single­
product fisheries. Almost all of the eco­
nomic and biological specifications of 
the technology used in fisheries assume 
the technology is nonjoint-in-inputs or 
sufficient conditions exist for input and 
output aggregation. I suspect, as does 
Clark (1985), that a single-product fish­
ery is quite rare. In the event of multiple 
products, the economic analysis and de­
tennination of optimum yields is likely to 
be very difficult. 
In many of the empirical economic 
studies of fisheries, ad-hoc economic 
specifications are used. On occasion, 
from 5 to 20 equations may be specified 
and estimated as part of a system, but not 
one of the equations will be consistent 
with economic theory. How, then, are 
such results to be interpreted and applied 
to fisheries management. More impor­
tant, what is the valuation of economics 
by managers when presented with such 
results. 
In a "round-about" way, I am suggest­
ing a need for more basic economic re­
search in fisheries. That is, if economics 
is to serve as a basis for optimal manage­
ment, we, as economists, must provide 
good economic analysis of the basic is­
sues. A partial review of the economic 
programs and research within NMFS fur­
ther illustrates this need and highlights 
the lack of importance placed on eco­
nomics. NMFS is selected because it is 
the "national" fisheries agency, and thus, 
should indicate the importance placed 
and conveyed to others on the economics 
of fisheries. 
The economics program of NMFS 
consists of economists located in Wash­
ington, D.C., (!nd at several centers, re­
gional offices, and laboratories. There 
does not appear to be a well defined goal 
and set of research objectives for the pro­
gram. However, a substantial amount of 
analysis and research is conducted by 
these economists. This includes analysis 
of ex-vessel prices, productivity, im­
ports, and the technology. Unfortu­
nately, this research is most often reac­
tive or necessitated by a problem which 
must be analyzed over a very short time­
period. These conditions likely prevent 
the implementation of a basic research 
program and limit economic analysis. 
It is more alarming that, given the 
level of resources allocated to econom­
ics, inadequate but still quite large, there 
27 
are no routine economic reports and anal­
ysis. I consider the "Fisheries of the 
United States" publication and similar re­
ports to be data summaries and not eco­
nomic reports. For example, there is no 
regular publication on productivity, the 
status and implications of imports, costs 
and utilization of the factors of produc­
tion, short-run price projections, or the 
economic implications of management 
plans and regulations. There, in fact, is 
no routine publication that summarizes 
the number of fishermen, vessels, land­
ings, and revenue by fishery, region, or 
state. This type of information is rou­
tinely produced by other government 
agencies concerned with the develop­
ment, management, and regulation of 
other industries. 
This gives the impression that NMFS 
is not very concerned with economics. If 
this is the case, the gap between eco­
nomic theory and fisheries management 
is not likely to be narrowed. 
To narrow the gap, NMFS must as­
sume a leadership role, at least, in the 
identification of issues in need of basic 
research, NMFS, along with the states, 
universities, Councils, industry, and con­
cerned individuals, must provide sub­
stantial resource support. This includes 
funding, data access, and identification 
of the issues in need of attention. In tum, 
our job as economists is to conduct com­
petent research on the basic-issues. I be­
lieve we will discover that once we pro­
vide competent research on the basic 
issues, economics will become a signifi­
cant driving force in the management of 
fisheries under MFCMA. 
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